Misrepresenting Tenor And Misunderstanding Power And Solidarity

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 295):

Tenor is concerned with the kind of relationship FitzSimons constructs with his readers. Its key dimensions are power and solidarity. Power is concerned with hierarchical social relations, solidarity with horizontal ones. As far as power is concerned, FitzSimons' position is an authoritative one – he writes for us to read and we read what he writes. The only real say we have is a yet to be realised one, solicited in his invitation to e-mail him with suggestions for historical anecdotes he might use. As we have seen, FitzSimons' authority is enhanced inter-modally – verbally through his blue coloured by-line in the text's macro-Theme and imagically through his Ideal/New position above the image of the beach.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 33) explain the interpersonal dimension of context as follows:

tenor – who is taking part in the situation: (i) the roles played by those taking part in the socio-semiotic activity – (1) institutional roles, (2) status roles (power, either equal or unequal), (3) contact roles (familiarity, ranging from strangers to intimates) and (4) sociometric roles (affect, either neutral or charged, positively or negatively); and (ii) the values that the interactants imbue the domain with (either neutral or loaded, positively or negatively)

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, power is but one system of tenor, and it distinguishes between equal ("horizontal") and unequal ("vertical") status. Relations of solidarity, contrary to the authors' claim, can obtain both between those of equal status ("horizontally") and between those of unequal status ("vertically") — the latter demonstrated by the solidarity between Martin (high status) and his students (low status).

[3] This is misleading, because it confuses dialogic role (writer vs reader) with interpersonal status (unequal vs equal). Clearly, it is not the role of writer that confers higher status in an exchange, as demonstrated by texts written by job applicants.

[4] This is misleading, because neither of these claims about authority have been previously argued for. That is, no argument has been offered as to why a by-line expressed in the colour blue should enhance the authority of the columnist, and no argument has been offered as to why the mere positioning of the columnist's name at the top of his newspaper column should enhance his authority. 

And, as previously explained, this usage of 'ideal' mistakes a construal of experience for textual status, and no argument has been offered as to why the name of the regular columnist should be interpreted as presented as New information.

Moreover, even in their own terms, the authors here have confused textual status (Ideal, New) with interpersonal status (power, authority).

Misconstruing Social Context As Language Varieties

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 294):

Martin & Rose (2003) interface with grammar on the discourse semantic side, and we've illustrated how to move from ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning in grammar to the discourse structuring resources which they realise. Working with Discourse in turn interfaces with models of social context, specifically the model of register (field, tenor and mode) outlined in Martin (1992) and the work on genre consolidated in Martin & Rose (2008).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this claim is based on the sub-headings 2.1 Theme and information flow, 2.2 Clause complexing and conjunction, 2.3 Transitivity and ideation, and 2.4 Nominal Groups, ideation and identification. See the relevant previous posts for the theoretical problems with each of these "illustrations":

• Misrepresenting Theme
• Misrepresenting Rhematic And Ellipsed Subjects As Theme [1]
• Misrepresenting Rhematic And Ellipsed Subjects As Theme [2]
• Misrepresenting Rhematic And Ellipsed Subjects As Theme [3]
• Misrepresenting Rhematic And Ellipsed Subjects As Theme [4]
• Misrepresenting The General Thematic Pattern Of A Text
• The Problem With Hyper-Theme As Linguistic Theory
• The Problems With Hyper-Theme And Hyper-New As Linguistic Theory
• The Problem With Macro-Theme As Linguistic Theory
• Misrepresenting IFG On Temporal Relations
• Misrepresenting Temporal Relations In A Text
• Misrepresenting IFG And Mistaking Continuity For Internal Conjunction
• Failing To Distinguish Continuity From Conjunction
• Misrepresenting Internal Relations
• Confusing Two Distinct Texts
• Misrepresenting Ellipsed Subjects As Unmarked Themes
• Misrepresenting The Ergative Model As The Transitive Model
• The Difference Between Martin's 'Activity Sequence' And Halliday's 'Sequence'
• Confusing Nominal Group Structure With Lexical Cohesion
• The Discourse Semantic System Of Participant Identification
• Misconstruing Reference As Tracking And Confusing Reference With Lexical Cohesion
• Identity Chains As The Confusion Of Reference And Lexical Cohesion [1]
• Problems With 'Tracking' And 'Esphora'
• Identity Chains As The Confusion Of Reference And Lexical Cohesion [2]
• Misrepresenting Writing Pedagogy As Linguistic Theory
• Misrepresenting Text Reference

[2] To be clear, Martin ± Rose (1992, 2003, 2007, 2008) confuse the social context (field, tenor, mode) realised in language with functional varieties of language (registers/text types), with the term 'genre' confusing text type with contextual mode ('purpose') and non-metafunctional semantic structure ('stages').

Misconstruing Reference As Tracking And Confusing Reference With Lexical Cohesion

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 285):

Collectively, these waves are then tracked using the definite article the, possessive pronoun their, and the pronouns they and it (strangely for the latter, since there is more than one wave involved at this stage of the text). In addition there are two examples of indirect reference (or bridging), which make use of meronymy to treat the boiling surf and the water as if already given (in relation to the waves).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, what the authors describe as the writer "tracking" the waves is the writer using various types of cohesive anaphoric reference:

• personal (it, their, they, it)
• comparative (another, another, yet more)
• demonstrative (the)

[2] To be clear, 'bridging' (Martin 1992) confuses two distinct types of textual cohesion: reference and lexical cohesion. Evidence here.

Misrepresenting IFG And Mistaking Continuity For Internal Conjunction

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 281):

A further limitation of the grammatical approach outlined in IFG 3rd edition is its backgrounding of the important distinction between what Halliday & Hasan (1976) call internal and external conjunction. External conjunctions construct logical relations between events in the field of discourse; internal relations construct rhetorical relations among phases of unfolding text. FitzSimons for example begins his text with And so, even though he hasn't mentioned any events which could be construed as causing people to be lying on the beach. The causal relation here is a rhetorical one, related to us settling down with text and image and starting to read because we have the feature in front of us.

And so there they lie, ||

happily sweltering in the summer sun on Australia's most famous beach, ||

just as they have for so many generations past. |||

It is such a wonderfully peaceful scene – of people and nature as a happy whole – [[that it is simply unimaginable [[that in a few seconds nature could ever rear up|| and savage the lot of them]].]] |||

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 542-3, 545-6):

Many temporal conjunctives have an ‘internal’ as well as an ‘external’ interpretation; that is, the time they refer to is the temporal unfolding of the discourse itself, not the temporal sequence of the processes referred to. In terms of the functional components of semantics, it is interpersonal not experiential time. Parallel to the ‘simple’ categories above we can recognise the simple internal ones set out in Table 9(6) above. These play an important role in argumentative passages in discourse.

Moreover, here the authors contradict their own former similarly false claim (p280n) that because this distinction is foregrounded, the distinction between simultaneous and successive relations is backgrounded:

Contrast IFG 3rd edition 542-3 which focuses grammatically on simple, complex and simple internal temporal relations, with several subdivisions within each of these; the opposition of successive to simultaneous events is not a major parameter.

Here the authors have ceased to provide a guide to IFG, and have switched to misrepresenting IFG in order to promote Martin's model (of Halliday & Hasan 1976) instead.

[2] This is misleading. Both external and internal conjunction are concerned with the logical relation of expansion. In the case of temporal relations, the distinction is between experiential time and the interpersonal time of the unfolding of the discourse.

[3] This is misleading, because the function served by And so is continuity, not conjunction, and as such, it does not construe a causal relation, internally or rhetorically. Its function is simply 'to signal that a new move is beginning' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 145).

Misrepresenting Temporal Relations In A Text

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 279-80, 281):

As we might expect, successive (then, now, finally, after) and simultaneous (as, with) temporal conjunctions are used to time events; but there are many implicit temporal links with events connected 'neutrally' by simple juxtaposition, and, or the dependency of non-finite clauses on finite ones. The text, as do stories in general, thus takes advantage of field based understandings, in this case of what happens when big waves hit a beach and a rescue operation gets underway – a reasonable expectation in an article composed for beach-savvy Sydneysiders.

We can also note that many of these relations obtain between clauses inside clause complexes, and others between clause complexes – since successive and simultaneous temporal relations can be realised in either way. For example, the same phrase and then functions both within and between clause complexes during the waves' attack above, highlighting the borders of a purely grammatical approach to logical relations:

^ And then another wave hit, ||

^ and then another. |||

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because here the authors misunderstand with as marking a temporal (enhancing) relation, instead of an additive (extending) relation, despite having previously correctly identified it as extension in Table 7.1.

[2] This is misleading. Firstly, simple juxtaposition does not express an implicit temporal relation, as demonstrated by all the juxtaposed clauses that are not related temporally. Secondly, the only temporal relations marked by and are those marked by and then, and these are all 'explicit temporal links'. Thirdly, the dependency of non-finite clauses, in itself, does not mark a temporal relation, and in this text, as Table 7.1 shows, none of the dependent non-finite clauses are temporally related to their dominant clause.

[3] To be clear, the (second-order) field of this particular situation, the subject matter, is construed by the text itself. The text explicitly describes 'what happens when big waves hit a beach and a rescue operation gets underway'.

[4] To be clear, temporal relations that obtain within clause complexes are structural relations and function logically, whereas temporal relations that obtain between clause complexes are cohesive relations and function textually. This distinction is lost in Martin's discourse semantic model.

Misrepresenting Identifiability As A Textual Function Of Nominal Group Structure

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 225):

For example, the textual metafunction deals with thematicity at clause rank (in terms of thematic structure) but with identifiability at group rank (in terms of deictic items, as in this hall vs. a hall).

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it misrepresents identifiability as the group rank analogue of thematicity at clause rank.

Firstly, in the nominal group, the textual metafunction is realised throughout the entire structure. Halliday (1994: 191):

Textual meaning is embodied throughout the entire structure, since it determines the order in which the elements are arranged, as well as patterns of information structure just as in the clause … .

Secondly, the initial position of both Theme and Deictic reflects the same textual principle. Halliday (1994: 187):

So the principle that puts the Theme first in the clause is the same as that which puts the Deictic first in the nominal group: start by locating the Thing in relation to the here-&-now – in the space-time context of the ongoing speech event.

But, importantly, this the structural deictic function — the system of DETERMINATION — not the cohesive reference function ("identifiabilty"). That is, the authors have once again confused determination with reference. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 365):

The Deictic element indicates whether or not some specific subset of the Thing is intended; and if so, which. The nature of the Deictic is determined by the system of DETERMINATION. The primary distinction is between (i) specific or (ii) non-specific.

Thirdly, the irrelevant notion of 'identifiability' is itself a misunderstanding of cohesive reference, because it misconstrues the recoverable identity of a reference item as the identifiability of the nominal group featuring the reference item.

Misrepresenting Conflation

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 169):

2.1.3 Conflation of multivariate structure and univariate structure

Blogger Comments:

This misrepresents conflation, because it misunderstands structure. It is elements of structures that can be conflated, not structures. This is because a structure consists of the relationships between elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

and relationships of different metafunctions cannot be conflated. For example, the relationship of the Subject to the Adjunct in the clause they were defeated by the referee cannot be conflated with the relationship of the Medium to the Agent.

Seriously Misrepresenting The Embodiment Of The Metafunctions In The Nominal Group

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 166):

Like a clause, a nominal group embodies all three metafunctions.  

Experientially a nominal group construes a participant – a conscious being (human or animal), an animal not treated as conscious, an institution, a discrete object, a substance, or an abstraction. The group provides the resources for construing a participant as a thing located somewhere in a taxonomy of things expanded by a range of different qualities.  

Interpersonally, a nominal group enacts a person – a role defined by reference to the interaction as either an interactant (‘first/second person’) or a non-interactant (‘third person’) and it can be expanded by various interpersonal assessments.  

Textually, a nominal group presents a discourse referent – a participant and person created as part of a message with status as recoverable (identifiable) to the addressee (e.g. that bird) or as non-recoverable (non-identifiable) at a given point in the discourse (e.g. a bird).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. A clause embodies all three metafunctions in the systems and structures of the clause. So, like a clause, a nominal group embodies all three metafunctions in the systems and structures of the nominal group. (See the following post.)

However, the authors do not address the question of how all three metafunctions are embodied in the systems and structures of the nominal group. Instead, they focus on the semantics that the nominal group, as a unit, realises.

[2] To be clear, this is the semantics of 'participant', the ideational element that the nominal group realises. That is, the focus is on semantics, not grammar.

[3] To be clear, this is the semantics of a proposed interpersonal element that the nominal group is proposed to realise. That is, the focus again is on semantics, not grammar. But consider the so-called 'persons' enacted in:

[4] To be clear, this is the semantics of a proposed textual element that the nominal group is proposed to realise. That is, the focus again is on semantics, not grammar. But consider the so-called 'referents' presented in:

Most importantly, neither that bird nor a bird is a referent unless referred to elsewhere in a text. That is, the authors mistake a nominal group with a reference item (that bird) — or without (a bird) — for a referent. Moreover, the authors mistake the recoverable identity signalled by the reference item (that) for the identifiability (of the Thing) of the nominal group featuring the reference item (that bird).

These types of misunderstandings of cohesive reference can be found in Martin (1992), Matthiessen (1995), and the two editions of IFG edited by Matthiessen (2004, 2014). For a a self-consistent exposition of reference, see the original model in Halliday & Hasan (1976), Halliday (1985) and Halliday (1994).

Misrepresenting Material And Verbal Clauses As Behavioural [2]

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125-6):

Alternatively, if it is useful to highlight the relationship with an agnate mental or verbal clause, you may choose to label the second participant as Phenomenon or Verbiage:

Note that some behavioural clauses of the verbal subtype will also admit a Target role, as in:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, analysing they solved the problem as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the second participant — which is not a behaviour — is Medium, rather than Range (Behaviour):

[2] To be clear, analysing the Range of the anomalous verb watch as Phenomenon is the suggestion of Halliday (1994: 139):

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

[3] To be clear, analysing they described the new project to the Board as a behavioural Process with one behavioural participant (Behaver) and two verbal participants (Verbiage and Receiver) is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory. As previously noted, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 347) identify such clauses as verbal:

The two kinds of Verbiage, that which refers to the content, as in describe the apartment, and that which specifies the nature of the verbal process, like tell a story, are analogous respectively to the material ‘entity Scope’ and ‘process Scope’.

That is, consistent with verbal processes, the Medium is construed as a symbol source, and the Range is the content of what is said (Verbiage).

[4] To be clear, analysing they insulted her (to her face) as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the clause does not accept a Range (Behaviour): they laughed a great laugh, but not they insulted a great insult. In SFL terms, the clause is simply a targeted verbal:

Problems With Scope As A Behavioural Participant

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

IFG3: 251 suggests that where the participant role re-expresses the process meaning as in he sang a song, she smiled her mysterious smile, the participant be termed the Behaviour to capture this fact. However, there are many behavioural clauses where this would not be an apposite term for the second participant. And since the Behaviour role is clearly very close to the role of Scope in such material clauses as they took a walk; they had a rest, it is simpler to extend the term Scope to all cases of a second participant in a behavioural clause. This would bring out the fact that such clauses treat mental and verbal processing too as material activity.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The only behavioural clauses where the second participant is not a behaviour, are those featuring the anomalous verb watch. As previously demonstrated, the authors' claim derives from confusing behavioural clauses with verbal and material clauses.

[2] To be clear, here the authors are simply adjusting the theory to accommodate their inability to understand it, and in doing so, creating unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies that risk reducing its explanatory power.

[3] To be clear, this is merely a pretext. Behavioural clauses already construe mental and near verbal processes along the lines of material processes. Adding a material participant to all ranged behavioural clauses is thus redundant (as well as theoretically inconsistent). 

Misrepresenting A Verbal Quoting Complex As A Behavioural Clause

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124-5):

One final borderline case is when a sound is ‘quoted’, usually with go realising the process. For example:

the tyres went ‘screech!’

the little engine went ‘wheeee!’

the car went ‘bang!’

It is not possible to have a Receiver in these clauses since the sound is simply a sound and not a piece of language being addressed to anyone. They are therefore moving towards the material end of a cline and are best treated as behavioural.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these are clause complexes, not clauses; see [2].

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, each of these is a material happening realised metaphorically as a clause complex: a verbal clause projecting a quoted minor clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 510-1):

In fact, paratactic projection allows for a greater range: we can quote not only propositions and proposals but also minor speech functions such as greetings and exclamations…

In this case, the authors have misunderstood a material-verbal correspondence in a grammatical metaphor as the overlap of material and verbal features in a behavioural clause.

Again, proposing that behavioural processes can project unnecessarily complicates the theory without adding any explanatory power.

Misrepresenting Targeted Verbal Processes As Behavioural

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124):

We can also include on the behavioural borderline such ‘judgmental’ verbal processes as flatter, insult, praise, malign, slander, abuse which have the peculiarity of allowing for an additional participant role, the Target. These are analysed in IFG2: 141, IFG3: 256 as follows:

But as noted in IFG, they cannot project reported speech and are towards the material end of a cline. Because they cannot project, these too could be taken as behavioural and analysed in the following way:

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, once again the authors are proposing that a subset of verbal clauses should be reclassified as behavioural merely because they cannot report. There are several factors that invalidate this proposal, any of which would be sufficient on its own.

[1] The blanket statement that targeted verbal processes cannot report is invalidated by the following unremarkable example:

[2] Reclassifying targeted verbal clauses as behavioural clauses creates inconsistencies in terms of ergativity. Compare:

with the authors' proposed analysis:

To be clear, conflating Behaver with Agent in this instance complicates the description without adding any explanatory power not already provided by Halliday's original interpretation.

[3] Target and Receiver are participants of verbal clauses, and do not occur in genuine behavioural clauses: *They grumbled her to her parents.

[4] Unlike genuine behavioural processes, targeted verbal processes do not accept a Behaviour as a Range participant: *They insulted an insult.

Seriously Misrepresenting Behavioural And Verbal Processes

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124, 124n):

Note that there are a number of processes representing verbal behaviour – talk, chatter, gossip, speak, lie – that are behavioural rather than verbal¹⁸; they cannot project. (See Table 4.9 above for examples.) For example, we cannot say they gossiped that their neighbours had had a wild party. (Note that while behavioural process can, in a written narrative, project by quoting: ‘I enjoyed it thoroughly’, he lied, a true verbal process can project both direct and indirect speech in all contexts.)

¹⁸ IFG3: 251 Table 5(24) lists these as verbs functioning in behavioural clauses; however they also appear on p. 255 as examples of verbs functioning in verbal clauses of ‘activity’. The inability of such clauses to project is an argument for preferring the behavioural interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents behavioural processes. In such cases, the lexical choice adds a behavioural feature to a verbal Process. Halliday (1994: 139):

…while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’…

However, in the case of lied, what is added to the verbal Process is the quality 'untruthful':

[2] To be clear, this is a bare assertion unsupported by argument. Just as not all mental processes project, not all verbal processes easily project reported speech, Halliday (1994: 141) observes:

[3] This is misleading, since the only verb common to both lists is talk. The 'behavioural' list is chatter, grumble, talk, gossip, argue, murmur, mouth whereas the 'verbal activity' list is praise, insult, abuse, slander, flatter, blame, criticise, chide, speak, talk.

But, more importantly, the fundamental misunderstanding here is that verbs can be assigned to process types, without regard to the clauses in which they function.

[4] To be clear, even if a difficulty in reporting were equivalent to an inability to project, this is demonstrably still a very inadequate reason for interpreting targeting verbal clauses as behavioural clauses, because it creates unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies.  For example, a behavioural clause is middle voice, with the Behaver as Medium, whereas a targeted verbal clause is effective voice with Target as Medium, so that in a behavioural interpretation, the Behaver of such clauses must function as Agent, not Medium.

Moreover, a behavioural clause construes its first participant, Behaver, as conscious, whereas a targeted verbal clause, like other verbal clauses, only construes its first participant, Sayer, as a symbol source: the newspapers blamed the Trump supporters. And following on this, a behavioural clause construes its Medium participant, Behaver, as conscious, whereas, in a targeted verbal clause, the Medium participant, Target, need not even be animate: the report of the bureau of meteorology blamed La Niña.

To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354) provide eight criteria that distinguish verbal processes. Singling out just one of these, the ability to project, and giving it priority, results in unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies which add nothing to the explanatory power of the theory.

Misunderstanding The Complement vs Adjunct Distinction

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 72-3):

The Complement is in a complementary role to the Subject; that is, it has the status of 'potential Subject'. That potential could be realised if the voice of the clause were active rather than passive or vice versa. As a potential Subject, the Complement is realised by a nominal group, while an Adjunct is realised by a prepositional phrase or adverbial group: 

The first Complement in the above examples also has the experiential role of Beneficiary. This particular experiential role can also be realised later in the clause in a prepositional form, as shown below: 

In its prepositional form a Beneficiary is treated as an Adjunct in IFG, on the grounds that it cannot be a Subject in this form. Nonetheless some analysts would argue for regarding it as a Complement here too. Although to Linda or for my father is not a potential Subject, his mum or Linda does have the potential for becoming Subject without the preposition remaining in the structure:

Linda wasn't told that by him.

My father is being made a cup of tea by Angela in the kitchen.

Sharon may be sold the car at a cheap price by them.

His mum will be sent some flowers by him at Christmas. …

A similar argument applies to a by __ phrase which fills the experiential role of Agent, as in Linda will be told that by Peter or His mum will be sent some flowers by him. In IFG these are treated as Adjuncts, indicating that when agency is expressed in this form it has a more peripheral status than when it is mapped on to the interpersonal Subject role, as in He will send his mum some flowers.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, "some analysts" include Martin, but not Matthiessen, and his view involves a very simple misunderstanding. To explain:

On the one hand, Beneficiaries and Agents realised by prepositional phrases, such as for my father and by Peter fulfil the Halliday's criterion for Adjunct, in that they are not potential Subjects.

On the other hand, however, what is a potential Subject, in such cases, is the minor Complement of the prepositional phrase serving as Adjunct. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 155):

A prepositional phrase, however, has its own internal structure, containing a nominal group serving as Complement within it. In by the duke, the duke is a Complement with respect to the preposition by (which serves as a Predicator). So, although by the duke is itself an Adjunct, and could not become Subject, it has as one of its constituents the duke, which is a Complement at another rank, and could become Subject.

For A "Full Analysis And Discussion" Of Speech Function

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 70n):

See IFG2:95-6; IFG3:153-4. For full analysis and discussion of speech function see Martin (1992); Martin and Rose (2007, Chapter 7).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, for a "full analysis and discussion" of speech function, see IFG1-4.

For a "full analysis and discussion" of the misunderstandings of speech function in Martin (1992) see here, especially here.

For a "full analysis and discussion" of the misunderstandings of speech function in Martin & Rose (2007) see here, especially here.