Misrepresenting The Interpersonal Range Of The Medium

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 158):

Thus we can now revise the table of correspondences between transitivity functions and interpersonal functions. See Table 4.23. The interesting result is that the participant function we have called the Medium stands out among the participant functions: it is the only one that serves as Subject or Complement but not as Adjunct. Agent, Beneficiary and Range are closer to circumstances in that they can also be mapped onto Adjunct. 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it misrepresents the interpersonal variability of the Medium. Medium conflates with Adjunct in medio-receptive and locative-receptive clauses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 342, 345, 351):

Problems With Transitivity Options And Examples

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 155):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, consistent with their own views, but inconsistent with SFL Theory and reasoned argument, the authors here misrepresent an effective verbal clause they criticised IFG as an effective behavioural clause; see previous posts. Moreover, the authors have nowhere addressed the ergative roles of these clause types — e.g. "Behaver" as Agent — that they misconstrue as behavioural.

[2] To be clear, the example of an effective perceptive mental clause the kite caught her attention is metaphorical. A more congruent example would be she was assailed by the flashing lights and thumping dance music.

[3] To be clear, emotive mental clauses are labelled 'affective', and desiderative mental clauses are omitted altogether (as in IFG1&2, but not IFG3&4).

[4] To be clear, the examples of effective relational (identifying) clauses are only effective if they are encoding, and this is only if they have marked information focus, such that Token conflates with New. With unmarked information focus, Value conflates with New, and the clauses are all middle, not effective.

(a) effective identifying: encoding (marked information focus)

(b) middle identifying: decoding (unmarked information focus)

On the other hand, all assigned relational clauses, both identifying and attributive, are effective.

Omissions In The Major Options In Transitivity

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 153-4):

The major options in TRANSITIVITY as they are presented in IFG are summarised in the system network in Figure 4.7, with references to sections in IFG2 followed by references to IFG3 if different.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the problems with this network are largely minor, and are perhaps merely simplifications to accommodate the newcomer. For example, in terms of the system itself:

1. the network wiring cross-classifies middle vs effective with happening and doing and with 'like type' and 'please type', even though happening and 'like type' can only be middle, and doing and 'please type' can only be effective; 
2. the system of mental processes omits desiderative and labels emotive as affective, and 
3. the relational system omits the system of ASSIGNMENT, despite it being central to the discussion.

In terms of the participants listed according to ergative function:

1. the Range of material processes, Scope, is omitted;
2. the Medium and Range of behavioural processes, Behaver and Behaviour, are omitted;
3. the Agent of 'like type' mental processes, Inducer' is omitted;
4. the Target of verbal processes is omitted;
5. the Attributor and Assigner of relational clauses are omitted; and
6. the Token (Medium) and Value (Range) of decoding identifying clauses are omitted.

However, of these, the omissions of Scope, Behaver, Behaviour and Target are motivated, and so misleading, since the authors reinterpret material Scope and verbal Target as behavioural participants, and do not address the question of the ergative roles in the targeted verbal clauses that they reinterpret as behavioural.

Seriously Misleading Misrepresentations In Exercise 8: Discriminating Verbal And Agentive Identifying Clauses

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 149):

Analyse the following clauses as verbal or relational identifying, assigning Assigner + Value (+Token) or Sayer roles as appropriate. See Section 3.6 (vi) for agentive identifying clauses. For example:

 

1. She demonstrated that that was the case.

2. She asserted that it was obvious.

3. She proved her point.

4. The map indicates that this is the way.

5. Her actions confirmed their suspicions.

6. He confirmed he’d be there by six.

7. The report proves that the best solution.

8. Their reply shows that to be the point.

9. Their efforts ensured a quick result.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this exercise on discriminating verbal and agentive identifying clauses includes three clauses that are neither. The genuine verbal clauses are 1, 2, 4 & 6, and the genuine assigned identifying clauses are 7 & 8. However, clauses 3, 5 & 9 are attributive clauses in which the Process conflates with the Attribute (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 269):

This problem is compounded by the fact that the clause intended to exemplify an assigned identifying clause is also actually an assigned attributive clause:

though, perhaps, a case can be made for interpreting this as a verbal projection nexus, agnate to the results reported that E = mc²:

Seriously Misleading Misrepresentations In Exercise 4: Causative Mental And Verbal Clauses

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 147-8):

Analyse the following clauses as verbal or mental, including Sayer, Receiver or Inducer, Senser roles as appropriate. For example: 

1. They tried to convince them that resistance was futile.

2. He’d have liked Data to take charge.

3. He satisfied them that victory was possible.

4. She failed to teach them that Tokens were Subject in the active.

5. She implored them to leave.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This exercise is seriously misleading because it misrepresents verbal clauses as causative mental clauses. (Consequently, there are no Inducer participants in the clauses to be analysed.) Cf. Halliday (1994: 145-6):

In SFL Theory, the difference between the two example clauses is that the first is an imperating verbal clause, whereas the second so-called "causative mental" clause is an indicating verbal clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305):

The two example clauses are thus:

As can be seen, the imperating verbal clause projects a command, whereas the indicating verbal clause projects a statement realised in indicative mood.

In the exercise, the indicating verbal clauses that readers are misled to analyse as causative mental clauses are 1, 3 and 4:

[2] To be clear, of the remaining two clauses, 5 is the only example of an imperating verbal clause:

Clause 2, on the other hand, is neither an imperating verbal clause nor a "causative mental clause" (i.e. indicating verbal clause). Instead, it is only genuine mental clause, but not a causative, and with no Inducer. It is simply a desiderative mental clause projecting a proposal:

A Misrepresentation In Exercise 16: Discriminating Circumstances From Other Elements

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 143):

Label the participants and circumstances in the following clauses. See Table 4.4.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this is misleading because it misrepresents the Behaver of a behavioural clause, the two girls, as the Actor of a material clause; see Halliday (1994: 139); Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 251); Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302). Elsewhere in this publication, the authors inconsistently list dance as behavioural (p108) and material (p111, 117), despite it functioning in the same type of clause in every case.

A Problem With Exercise 12 Discriminating Scope from Goal

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 141):

Pick out a Scope or a Goal in each of the following examples. See Section 3.4 (iv).

Blogger Comment:

To be clear, the clause demonstrating the Scope participant is metaphorical. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 237n) explain:

Such clauses are in fact mildly metaphorical variants of clauses where kick, punch, kiss, hug, etc. is a verb serving as the Process: he gave the dog a kick: he kicked the dog. This suggests that the nominalised verb is in fact a Scope rather than a Goal and that what might at first appear to be a Recipient is in fact construed as a Goal…

The authors' analysis is thus:

However, the problem here is the inconsistency between the Process (material) and the Scope: process (mental), due to the fact that the clause is a metaphorical variant of a mental clause:

which can be metaphorised as:

and resequenced, on the basis of 'give' transitivity, as:

Cf. He never gave a thought to the matter => He never gave the matter a thought

Very Serious Problems With Exercise 9: Identifying Participants (Behavioural Clauses)

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 140)

Analyse the following clauses for Behaver, Scope (or Behaviour) and Target as required. See Section 3.8 (iii). 

1. She has described the problem clearly.

2. He insulted his audience.

3. He was talking rubbish.

4. She flattered her teacher.

5. They uttered a cry of joy.

6. He slandered his rival.

7. She blamed the judges.

8. She gave a speech.

9. He smiled a most compelling smile.

10. He pondered the problem.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Exercise 9 is highly problematic, because it requires the reader to analyse clauses that are not behavioural (1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10) as behavioural, and to identify material (Scope) and verbal (Target) participants as behavioural participants. See further below.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the example clause They praised Cæsar is a targeted verbal clause, not a behavioural clause:

[3] To be clear, clause 1 is not a behavioural clause. As previously explained, in such instances the clause is verbal (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 306, 347), not least because it construes the Medium as a symbol source and the Range as the content of what is said (Verbiage):

Likewise, clause 3 is not a behavioural clause, but a verbal clause:

The Range rubbish is not a behaviour, but an assessment of what was said.

And again, clause 8 is not a behavioural clause, but a verbal clause:

The Range a speech is not a behaviour, but a name for what was said.

[4] To be clear, clauses 2,4,6 & 7 are not behavioural clauses. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307) explain, these are targeted verbal clauses. Importantly, these clauses are effective in voice, and so operative or receptive, whereas behavioural clauses — apart from those like you make me laugh — are middle:

[5] To be clear, clause 10 is not a behavioural clause, but a mental clause: 

The verb ponder can serve as a projecting mental Process, as in she pondered whether it was true: 

It might be argued that the lexical choice adds a behavioural feature to the mental Process.

∞

In sum, of the 10 clauses presented for analysis as behavioural clauses, only 2 (5 & 9) are genuine behavioural clauses on the criteria of SFL Theory.

Problems With Exercise 8: Differentiating Behavioural From Verbal Processes

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 139):

Identify the process in the following examples as behavioural or verbal by checking whether or not the process can report another clause. (If yes, verbal)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the ability to report is not a reliable criterion for distinguishing verbal from behavioural processes, since targeting verbal processes do not easily project. This exercise includes one instance of a targeting verbal Process:

6. Everyone praised him

which would be falsely identified as behavioural on the basis of its inability to project.

An important distinction between targeting verbal clauses and behavioural clauses is voice. Unlike behavioural clauses, targeting verbal clauses are effective, and so operative or receptive, and the first participant is Agent, not Medium:

[2] Also problematic in this exercise, from a pedagogical point of view, is the unnecessary and confusing inclusion of the idiomatic expression in:

5. The baby was screaming its head off

where a nominal and adverbial group its head off together serve the same function as a single adverbial group very loudly (Manner circumstance).

A Problem With Exercise 7: Practising Tests To Discriminate Behavioural From Mental Processes

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 139):

Could the process in question report what was thought? (If yes, mental.)

e.g. He heard the news: he heard that they’d left.                      yes

e.g. He meditated in his room: he meditated that they’d left.   no

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misrepresents an embedded fact that they'd left of a mental clause of perception ('hear') as a report projected by a mental clause of cognition ('thought'). Mental processes of perception do not project; see Halliday & Matthiesesen (1999: 138-9). The embedded fact clause serves as the Phenomenon of the ranking clause:

A Problem With Exercise 8: Discriminating Process Types

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 132-3):

Label the following clauses as material, mental, verbal or relational. …

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this exercise excludes behavioural processes from its possible answers, but presents a behavioural process, lay, among the clauses to be classified.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 251):

Problems With Exercise 3: Practising The Projection Test

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 131):

Find a clause related to the example, which reports or quotes, as in the models:

Blogger Comments:

There are three problems here.

[1] The exercise confusingly asks for a clause that reports or quotes (α), whereas what is actually required is a clause that is reported or quoted (β).

[2] The model in the exercise misleads by including a projected clause that is neither a report or a quote, but an embedded fact in a non-projecting clause of perception:

[3] The exercise potentially misleads by including a behavioural clause:

5. The king smiled to himself

despite the fact that behavioural processes cannot project. What is true is that such verbs are used to add a behavioural feature to a quoting verbal Process. Halliday (1994: 139):

Note, finally, that while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’.

 That is, this exercise invites the reader to conclude, falsely, that behavioural processes project.

Predicated Theme As A Diagnostic Of Phrasal Verbs

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 126-7):

Often it will be obvious that the preposition must count as part of the process realisation. For example:

If in doubt, the best test is to check the ‘circumstance’ as the focus of theme predication.

??It was off the old bus they got.
?It was at the snail we were looking.
It wasn’t about the strike (that) they were worrying.
It was for a chat they called.

Where the prepositional phrase is feasible as a predicated Theme, as in the last two cases, it is likely to be functioning as a circumstance.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post.

[2] To be clear, The following predicated Theme is also feasible, perhaps more so:

It wasn't the the strike they were worrying about.

If this is the case, then worrying about can be reasonably construed as a phrasal verb serving as a mental Process, with the strike as Phenomenon.

Misrepresenting 'The Snail' As Behaviour

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 126):

Because of the prevalence of phrasal verbs in English, it may sometimes be difficult to decide whether to interpret a structure as process + circumstance or process + participant. For example, which is the best analysis of the following:

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, if looked at is analysed as a phrasal verb, then the snail functions as Phenomenon, on the model of the anomalous verb watch. Halliday (1994: 139)

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

This anomaly can be avoided, however, by following Halliday's advice and choosing the second alternative, where at the snail is interpreted as the locational orientation of the Process. Halliday (ibid.):

Some [types of behavioural clause] also regularly feature a prepositional phrase in it with to, at or on: I’m talking to you, don’t look at me, fortune is smiling on us. These are, in origin, circumstances of Place; in the behavioural context they express orientation but we may continue to use that label.

Importantly, the snail is clearly not a behaviour, and, in SFL Theory, Scope is not a participant of a behavioural Process.

Misrepresenting Material And Verbal Clauses As Behavioural [2]

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125-6):

Alternatively, if it is useful to highlight the relationship with an agnate mental or verbal clause, you may choose to label the second participant as Phenomenon or Verbiage:

Note that some behavioural clauses of the verbal subtype will also admit a Target role, as in:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, analysing they solved the problem as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the second participant — which is not a behaviour — is Medium, rather than Range (Behaviour):

[2] To be clear, analysing the Range of the anomalous verb watch as Phenomenon is the suggestion of Halliday (1994: 139):

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

[3] To be clear, analysing they described the new project to the Board as a behavioural Process with one behavioural participant (Behaver) and two verbal participants (Verbiage and Receiver) is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory. As previously noted, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 347) identify such clauses as verbal:

The two kinds of Verbiage, that which refers to the content, as in describe the apartment, and that which specifies the nature of the verbal process, like tell a story, are analogous respectively to the material ‘entity Scope’ and ‘process Scope’.

That is, consistent with verbal processes, the Medium is construed as a symbol source, and the Range is the content of what is said (Verbiage).

[4] To be clear, analysing they insulted her (to her face) as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the clause does not accept a Range (Behaviour): they laughed a great laugh, but not they insulted a great insult. In SFL terms, the clause is simply a targeted verbal: