Problems With Transitivity Options And Examples

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 155):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, consistent with their own views, but inconsistent with SFL Theory and reasoned argument, the authors here misrepresent an effective verbal clause they criticised IFG as an effective behavioural clause; see previous posts. Moreover, the authors have nowhere addressed the ergative roles of these clause types — e.g. "Behaver" as Agent — that they misconstrue as behavioural.

[2] To be clear, the example of an effective perceptive mental clause the kite caught her attention is metaphorical. A more congruent example would be she was assailed by the flashing lights and thumping dance music.

[3] To be clear, emotive mental clauses are labelled 'affective', and desiderative mental clauses are omitted altogether (as in IFG1&2, but not IFG3&4).

[4] To be clear, the examples of effective relational (identifying) clauses are only effective if they are encoding, and this is only if they have marked information focus, such that Token conflates with New. With unmarked information focus, Value conflates with New, and the clauses are all middle, not effective.

(a) effective identifying: encoding (marked information focus)

(b) middle identifying: decoding (unmarked information focus)

On the other hand, all assigned relational clauses, both identifying and attributive, are effective.

Seriously Misleading Misrepresentations In Exercise 8: Discriminating Verbal And Agentive Identifying Clauses

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 149):

Analyse the following clauses as verbal or relational identifying, assigning Assigner + Value (+Token) or Sayer roles as appropriate. See Section 3.6 (vi) for agentive identifying clauses. For example:

 

1. She demonstrated that that was the case.

2. She asserted that it was obvious.

3. She proved her point.

4. The map indicates that this is the way.

5. Her actions confirmed their suspicions.

6. He confirmed he’d be there by six.

7. The report proves that the best solution.

8. Their reply shows that to be the point.

9. Their efforts ensured a quick result.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this exercise on discriminating verbal and agentive identifying clauses includes three clauses that are neither. The genuine verbal clauses are 1, 2, 4 & 6, and the genuine assigned identifying clauses are 7 & 8. However, clauses 3, 5 & 9 are attributive clauses in which the Process conflates with the Attribute (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 269):

This problem is compounded by the fact that the clause intended to exemplify an assigned identifying clause is also actually an assigned attributive clause:

though, perhaps, a case can be made for interpreting this as a verbal projection nexus, agnate to the results reported that E = mc²:

Seriously Misleading Misrepresentations In Exercise 4: Causative Mental And Verbal Clauses

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 147-8):

Analyse the following clauses as verbal or mental, including Sayer, Receiver or Inducer, Senser roles as appropriate. For example: 

1. They tried to convince them that resistance was futile.

2. He’d have liked Data to take charge.

3. He satisfied them that victory was possible.

4. She failed to teach them that Tokens were Subject in the active.

5. She implored them to leave.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This exercise is seriously misleading because it misrepresents verbal clauses as causative mental clauses. (Consequently, there are no Inducer participants in the clauses to be analysed.) Cf. Halliday (1994: 145-6):

In SFL Theory, the difference between the two example clauses is that the first is an imperating verbal clause, whereas the second so-called "causative mental" clause is an indicating verbal clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305):

The two example clauses are thus:

As can be seen, the imperating verbal clause projects a command, whereas the indicating verbal clause projects a statement realised in indicative mood.

In the exercise, the indicating verbal clauses that readers are misled to analyse as causative mental clauses are 1, 3 and 4:

[2] To be clear, of the remaining two clauses, 5 is the only example of an imperating verbal clause:

Clause 2, on the other hand, is neither an imperating verbal clause nor a "causative mental clause" (i.e. indicating verbal clause). Instead, it is only genuine mental clause, but not a causative, and with no Inducer. It is simply a desiderative mental clause projecting a proposal:

Very Serious Problems With Exercise 9: Identifying Participants (Behavioural Clauses)

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 140)

Analyse the following clauses for Behaver, Scope (or Behaviour) and Target as required. See Section 3.8 (iii). 

1. She has described the problem clearly.

2. He insulted his audience.

3. He was talking rubbish.

4. She flattered her teacher.

5. They uttered a cry of joy.

6. He slandered his rival.

7. She blamed the judges.

8. She gave a speech.

9. He smiled a most compelling smile.

10. He pondered the problem.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Exercise 9 is highly problematic, because it requires the reader to analyse clauses that are not behavioural (1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10) as behavioural, and to identify material (Scope) and verbal (Target) participants as behavioural participants. See further below.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the example clause They praised Cæsar is a targeted verbal clause, not a behavioural clause:

[3] To be clear, clause 1 is not a behavioural clause. As previously explained, in such instances the clause is verbal (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 306, 347), not least because it construes the Medium as a symbol source and the Range as the content of what is said (Verbiage):

Likewise, clause 3 is not a behavioural clause, but a verbal clause:

The Range rubbish is not a behaviour, but an assessment of what was said.

And again, clause 8 is not a behavioural clause, but a verbal clause:

The Range a speech is not a behaviour, but a name for what was said.

[4] To be clear, clauses 2,4,6 & 7 are not behavioural clauses. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307) explain, these are targeted verbal clauses. Importantly, these clauses are effective in voice, and so operative or receptive, whereas behavioural clauses — apart from those like you make me laugh — are middle:

[5] To be clear, clause 10 is not a behavioural clause, but a mental clause: 

The verb ponder can serve as a projecting mental Process, as in she pondered whether it was true: 

It might be argued that the lexical choice adds a behavioural feature to the mental Process.

∞

In sum, of the 10 clauses presented for analysis as behavioural clauses, only 2 (5 & 9) are genuine behavioural clauses on the criteria of SFL Theory.

Problems With Exercise 8: Differentiating Behavioural From Verbal Processes

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 139):

Identify the process in the following examples as behavioural or verbal by checking whether or not the process can report another clause. (If yes, verbal)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the ability to report is not a reliable criterion for distinguishing verbal from behavioural processes, since targeting verbal processes do not easily project. This exercise includes one instance of a targeting verbal Process:

6. Everyone praised him

which would be falsely identified as behavioural on the basis of its inability to project.

An important distinction between targeting verbal clauses and behavioural clauses is voice. Unlike behavioural clauses, targeting verbal clauses are effective, and so operative or receptive, and the first participant is Agent, not Medium:

[2] Also problematic in this exercise, from a pedagogical point of view, is the unnecessary and confusing inclusion of the idiomatic expression in:

5. The baby was screaming its head off

where a nominal and adverbial group its head off together serve the same function as a single adverbial group very loudly (Manner circumstance).

Misrepresenting Material And Verbal Clauses As Behavioural [2]

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125-6):

Alternatively, if it is useful to highlight the relationship with an agnate mental or verbal clause, you may choose to label the second participant as Phenomenon or Verbiage:

Note that some behavioural clauses of the verbal subtype will also admit a Target role, as in:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, analysing they solved the problem as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the second participant — which is not a behaviour — is Medium, rather than Range (Behaviour):

[2] To be clear, analysing the Range of the anomalous verb watch as Phenomenon is the suggestion of Halliday (1994: 139):

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

[3] To be clear, analysing they described the new project to the Board as a behavioural Process with one behavioural participant (Behaver) and two verbal participants (Verbiage and Receiver) is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory. As previously noted, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 347) identify such clauses as verbal:

The two kinds of Verbiage, that which refers to the content, as in describe the apartment, and that which specifies the nature of the verbal process, like tell a story, are analogous respectively to the material ‘entity Scope’ and ‘process Scope’.

That is, consistent with verbal processes, the Medium is construed as a symbol source, and the Range is the content of what is said (Verbiage).

[4] To be clear, analysing they insulted her (to her face) as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the clause does not accept a Range (Behaviour): they laughed a great laugh, but not they insulted a great insult. In SFL terms, the clause is simply a targeted verbal:

Problems With Scope As A Behavioural Participant

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

IFG3: 251 suggests that where the participant role re-expresses the process meaning as in he sang a song, she smiled her mysterious smile, the participant be termed the Behaviour to capture this fact. However, there are many behavioural clauses where this would not be an apposite term for the second participant. And since the Behaviour role is clearly very close to the role of Scope in such material clauses as they took a walk; they had a rest, it is simpler to extend the term Scope to all cases of a second participant in a behavioural clause. This would bring out the fact that such clauses treat mental and verbal processing too as material activity.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The only behavioural clauses where the second participant is not a behaviour, are those featuring the anomalous verb watch. As previously demonstrated, the authors' claim derives from confusing behavioural clauses with verbal and material clauses.

[2] To be clear, here the authors are simply adjusting the theory to accommodate their inability to understand it, and in doing so, creating unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies that risk reducing its explanatory power.

[3] To be clear, this is merely a pretext. Behavioural clauses already construe mental and near verbal processes along the lines of material processes. Adding a material participant to all ranged behavioural clauses is thus redundant (as well as theoretically inconsistent). 

Misrepresenting Verbal Processes As Mental

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

Verbal or mental?

Note too that a small set of ‘verbal judgement’ verbs – see Section 3.7 (i) above – such as condone, criticise, excuse, applaud may also occur with an embedded fact clause: The press applauded the fact that no violence occurred; The press condoned the fact that some violence occurred. In these contexts, no Receiver is possible and such verbs are functioning as mental processes of emotion.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the crucial distinction between mental and verbal clauses is that mental clauses construe the Medium participant as a conscious thing, whereas a verbal clause construes it as a symbol source, conscious or otherwise. If these clauses were to be interpreted as 'mental: emotion', they would misconstrue non-conscious things, such as newspaper headlines, as experiencing emotions, as exemplified by:

Cf. genuine 'mental: emotion' clauses, which, unlike the above, are bi-directional:

Jim likes the fact that he was paid vs the fact that he was paid pleased Jim

Clearly, the purported impossibility of a Receiver is insufficient reason to classify such clauses as mental, and the clauses are verbal in every other respect:

Misrepresenting A Verbal Quoting Complex As A Behavioural Clause

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124-5):

One final borderline case is when a sound is ‘quoted’, usually with go realising the process. For example:

the tyres went ‘screech!’

the little engine went ‘wheeee!’

the car went ‘bang!’

It is not possible to have a Receiver in these clauses since the sound is simply a sound and not a piece of language being addressed to anyone. They are therefore moving towards the material end of a cline and are best treated as behavioural.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these are clause complexes, not clauses; see [2].

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, each of these is a material happening realised metaphorically as a clause complex: a verbal clause projecting a quoted minor clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 510-1):

In fact, paratactic projection allows for a greater range: we can quote not only propositions and proposals but also minor speech functions such as greetings and exclamations…

In this case, the authors have misunderstood a material-verbal correspondence in a grammatical metaphor as the overlap of material and verbal features in a behavioural clause.

Again, proposing that behavioural processes can project unnecessarily complicates the theory without adding any explanatory power.

Misrepresenting Targeted Verbal Processes As Behavioural

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124):

We can also include on the behavioural borderline such ‘judgmental’ verbal processes as flatter, insult, praise, malign, slander, abuse which have the peculiarity of allowing for an additional participant role, the Target. These are analysed in IFG2: 141, IFG3: 256 as follows:

But as noted in IFG, they cannot project reported speech and are towards the material end of a cline. Because they cannot project, these too could be taken as behavioural and analysed in the following way:

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, once again the authors are proposing that a subset of verbal clauses should be reclassified as behavioural merely because they cannot report. There are several factors that invalidate this proposal, any of which would be sufficient on its own.

[1] The blanket statement that targeted verbal processes cannot report is invalidated by the following unremarkable example:

[2] Reclassifying targeted verbal clauses as behavioural clauses creates inconsistencies in terms of ergativity. Compare:

with the authors' proposed analysis:

To be clear, conflating Behaver with Agent in this instance complicates the description without adding any explanatory power not already provided by Halliday's original interpretation.

[3] Target and Receiver are participants of verbal clauses, and do not occur in genuine behavioural clauses: *They grumbled her to her parents.

[4] Unlike genuine behavioural processes, targeted verbal processes do not accept a Behaviour as a Range participant: *They insulted an insult.

Seriously Misrepresenting Behavioural And Verbal Processes

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124, 124n):

Note that there are a number of processes representing verbal behaviour – talk, chatter, gossip, speak, lie – that are behavioural rather than verbal¹⁸; they cannot project. (See Table 4.9 above for examples.) For example, we cannot say they gossiped that their neighbours had had a wild party. (Note that while behavioural process can, in a written narrative, project by quoting: ‘I enjoyed it thoroughly’, he lied, a true verbal process can project both direct and indirect speech in all contexts.)

¹⁸ IFG3: 251 Table 5(24) lists these as verbs functioning in behavioural clauses; however they also appear on p. 255 as examples of verbs functioning in verbal clauses of ‘activity’. The inability of such clauses to project is an argument for preferring the behavioural interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents behavioural processes. In such cases, the lexical choice adds a behavioural feature to a verbal Process. Halliday (1994: 139):

…while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’…

However, in the case of lied, what is added to the verbal Process is the quality 'untruthful':

[2] To be clear, this is a bare assertion unsupported by argument. Just as not all mental processes project, not all verbal processes easily project reported speech, Halliday (1994: 141) observes:

[3] This is misleading, since the only verb common to both lists is talk. The 'behavioural' list is chatter, grumble, talk, gossip, argue, murmur, mouth whereas the 'verbal activity' list is praise, insult, abuse, slander, flatter, blame, criticise, chide, speak, talk.

But, more importantly, the fundamental misunderstanding here is that verbs can be assigned to process types, without regard to the clauses in which they function.

[4] To be clear, even if a difficulty in reporting were equivalent to an inability to project, this is demonstrably still a very inadequate reason for interpreting targeting verbal clauses as behavioural clauses, because it creates unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies.  For example, a behavioural clause is middle voice, with the Behaver as Medium, whereas a targeted verbal clause is effective voice with Target as Medium, so that in a behavioural interpretation, the Behaver of such clauses must function as Agent, not Medium.

Moreover, a behavioural clause construes its first participant, Behaver, as conscious, whereas a targeted verbal clause, like other verbal clauses, only construes its first participant, Sayer, as a symbol source: the newspapers blamed the Trump supporters. And following on this, a behavioural clause construes its Medium participant, Behaver, as conscious, whereas, in a targeted verbal clause, the Medium participant, Target, need not even be animate: the report of the bureau of meteorology blamed La Niña.

To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354) provide eight criteria that distinguish verbal processes. Singling out just one of these, the ability to project, and giving it priority, results in unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies which add nothing to the explanatory power of the theory.

Misrepresenting Verbal Clauses

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 118):

But on the one hand, a mental projection is an idea, whereas a verbal one is a locution, and on the other hand, while all verbal clauses can project, only certain mental ones can (namely, cognitive ones and certain affective ones).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, 'certain affective' here means 'desiderative', and though all verbal clauses can quote, those that include a Target do not easily report (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 307).

Misrepresenting Targeted Verbal Clauses As Behavioural

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 106, 108, 108n):

One sub-type of verbal clause (sometimes regarded as behavioural, see below Table 4.9) requires an extra participant, the Target, the entity construed as the target of the verbal action, as in she praised/insulted/blamed/criticised her father, where her father is in this role. …

¹⁰ IFG3: 255 treats the verbal subcategory of behaviourals as a special class of verbal process. (It is only members of this class that may involve a Target participant.) Unlike other verbal clauses, they cannot project another clause, and a projection has to be added by means of a verb like say, as in Then the monk praised Yang Shan saying: ‘I have come over to China in order to worship Manjucri, and met unexpectedly with Minor Shakya’ (although there are natural examples such as ‘Nelson played magnificent football’, Meek praised.). The closest to a representation of the content of praising, blaming, etc. in English is an enhancing clause of reason, as in She praised him for having acted so quickly; in Japanese, such clauses can in fact project (see Teruya, 2007). However, like verbal clauses, they can be construed with a Receiver, as in She praised him to her boss for having acted so quickly.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the question of whether targeted verbal processes (slander, insult, praise, flatter) are better reclassified as 'near verbal' behavioural processes (chatter, gossip, talk, speak) is a topological issue: a matter of degrees of relatedness. However, there are several criteria that can be used to clearly distinguish 'near verbal' behavioural processes from targeted verbal processes:

Firstly, the first participant of a 'near verbal' behavioural clause is construed as conscious (they chattered all day), whereas the first participant of a targeted verbal clause need only be a symbol source (the news story flattered him).

Secondly, the voice of a 'near verbal' behavioural clause is middle (they chattered all day), whereas the voice of a targeted verbal clause is effective, and so can be either operative (the news story flattered him) or receptive (he was flattered by the news story).

Thirdly, the unmarked present tense of a 'near verbal' behavioural clause is present-in-present (they are chattering in the garden), whereas the unmarked present tense of a targeted verbal clause is the simple present (that story flatters him).

Moreover, verbs that serve in targeted verbal clauses can also serve in assigning relational clauses, whereas verbs that serve in behavioural clauses cannot. That is, there is verbal assignment, but no behavioural assignment:

This demonstrates very clearly that reclassifying these verbal processes as behavioural is entirely unwarranted.

[2] This overstates the case. Although targeting verbal processes don't easily project (Halliday 1994: 141), even reporting cannot be entirely ruled out, as demonstrated by: