Problems With Scope As A Behavioural Participant

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

IFG3: 251 suggests that where the participant role re-expresses the process meaning as in he sang a song, she smiled her mysterious smile, the participant be termed the Behaviour to capture this fact. However, there are many behavioural clauses where this would not be an apposite term for the second participant. And since the Behaviour role is clearly very close to the role of Scope in such material clauses as they took a walk; they had a rest, it is simpler to extend the term Scope to all cases of a second participant in a behavioural clause. This would bring out the fact that such clauses treat mental and verbal processing too as material activity.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The only behavioural clauses where the second participant is not a behaviour, are those featuring the anomalous verb watch. As previously demonstrated, the authors' claim derives from confusing behavioural clauses with verbal and material clauses.

[2] To be clear, here the authors are simply adjusting the theory to accommodate their inability to understand it, and in doing so, creating unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies that risk reducing its explanatory power.

[3] To be clear, this is merely a pretext. Behavioural clauses already construe mental and near verbal processes along the lines of material processes. Adding a material participant to all ranged behavioural clauses is thus redundant (as well as theoretically inconsistent).