Problems With Exercise 3: Practising The Projection Test

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 131):

Find a clause related to the example, which reports or quotes, as in the models:

Blogger Comments:

There are three problems here.

[1] The exercise confusingly asks for a clause that reports or quotes (α), whereas what is actually required is a clause that is reported or quoted (β).

[2] The model in the exercise misleads by including a projected clause that is neither a report or a quote, but an embedded fact in a non-projecting clause of perception:

[3] The exercise potentially misleads by including a behavioural clause:

5. The king smiled to himself

despite the fact that behavioural processes cannot project. What is true is that such verbs are used to add a behavioural feature to a quoting verbal Process. Halliday (1994: 139):

Note, finally, that while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’.

 That is, this exercise invites the reader to conclude, falsely, that behavioural processes project.

Predicated Theme As A Diagnostic Of Phrasal Verbs

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 126-7):

Often it will be obvious that the preposition must count as part of the process realisation. For example:

If in doubt, the best test is to check the ‘circumstance’ as the focus of theme predication.

??It was off the old bus they got.
?It was at the snail we were looking.
It wasn’t about the strike (that) they were worrying.
It was for a chat they called.

Where the prepositional phrase is feasible as a predicated Theme, as in the last two cases, it is likely to be functioning as a circumstance.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post.

[2] To be clear, The following predicated Theme is also feasible, perhaps more so:

It wasn't the the strike they were worrying about.

If this is the case, then worrying about can be reasonably construed as a phrasal verb serving as a mental Process, with the strike as Phenomenon.

Misrepresenting 'The Snail' As Behaviour

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 126):

Because of the prevalence of phrasal verbs in English, it may sometimes be difficult to decide whether to interpret a structure as process + circumstance or process + participant. For example, which is the best analysis of the following:

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, if looked at is analysed as a phrasal verb, then the snail functions as Phenomenon, on the model of the anomalous verb watch. Halliday (1994: 139)

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

This anomaly can be avoided, however, by following Halliday's advice and choosing the second alternative, where at the snail is interpreted as the locational orientation of the Process. Halliday (ibid.):

Some [types of behavioural clause] also regularly feature a prepositional phrase in it with to, at or on: I’m talking to you, don’t look at me, fortune is smiling on us. These are, in origin, circumstances of Place; in the behavioural context they express orientation but we may continue to use that label.

Importantly, the snail is clearly not a behaviour, and, in SFL Theory, Scope is not a participant of a behavioural Process.

Misrepresenting Material And Verbal Clauses As Behavioural [2]

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125-6):

Alternatively, if it is useful to highlight the relationship with an agnate mental or verbal clause, you may choose to label the second participant as Phenomenon or Verbiage:

Note that some behavioural clauses of the verbal subtype will also admit a Target role, as in:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, analysing they solved the problem as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the second participant — which is not a behaviour — is Medium, rather than Range (Behaviour):

[2] To be clear, analysing the Range of the anomalous verb watch as Phenomenon is the suggestion of Halliday (1994: 139):

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

[3] To be clear, analysing they described the new project to the Board as a behavioural Process with one behavioural participant (Behaver) and two verbal participants (Verbiage and Receiver) is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory. As previously noted, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 347) identify such clauses as verbal:

The two kinds of Verbiage, that which refers to the content, as in describe the apartment, and that which specifies the nature of the verbal process, like tell a story, are analogous respectively to the material ‘entity Scope’ and ‘process Scope’.

That is, consistent with verbal processes, the Medium is construed as a symbol source, and the Range is the content of what is said (Verbiage).

[4] To be clear, analysing they insulted her (to her face) as a behavioural clause is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since the first participant is Agent, rather than Medium (Behaver), and the clause does not accept a Range (Behaviour): they laughed a great laugh, but not they insulted a great insult. In SFL terms, the clause is simply a targeted verbal:

Problems With Scope As A Behavioural Participant

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

IFG3: 251 suggests that where the participant role re-expresses the process meaning as in he sang a song, she smiled her mysterious smile, the participant be termed the Behaviour to capture this fact. However, there are many behavioural clauses where this would not be an apposite term for the second participant. And since the Behaviour role is clearly very close to the role of Scope in such material clauses as they took a walk; they had a rest, it is simpler to extend the term Scope to all cases of a second participant in a behavioural clause. This would bring out the fact that such clauses treat mental and verbal processing too as material activity.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The only behavioural clauses where the second participant is not a behaviour, are those featuring the anomalous verb watch. As previously demonstrated, the authors' claim derives from confusing behavioural clauses with verbal and material clauses.

[2] To be clear, here the authors are simply adjusting the theory to accommodate their inability to understand it, and in doing so, creating unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies that risk reducing its explanatory power.

[3] To be clear, this is merely a pretext. Behavioural clauses already construe mental and near verbal processes along the lines of material processes. Adding a material participant to all ranged behavioural clauses is thus redundant (as well as theoretically inconsistent). 

Misrepresenting Material And Verbal Clauses As Behavioural [1]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

Most behavioural clauses have only one participant role, the Behaver. However, there may, in some instances, be candidates for a second participant role. Consider for example: they solved the problem, they stared at the doctor; they watched the cricket, they described the new project.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not a behavioural clause, but a material clause:

Factors that support this analysis include: 

• unlike behavioural clauses, which are middle in voice, this clause is effective; 
• unlike behavioural clauses, where the first participant is the Medium of the Process, the first participant in this clause is the Agent, external cause, of the 'solving' Process;
• unlike behavioural clauses, where the second participant, Behaviour, is the Range of the Process, the second participant in this clause, the problem, is the Medium through which the 'solving' Process unfolds, and is not a behaviour;
• unlike behavioural clauses, where the second participant, Behaviour, is not affected by the Process, the second participant in this clause, the problem, is affected by the 'solving' Process.

[2] To be clear, this is a behavioural clause, but the doctor is clearly not a Behaviour of the first participant. Halliday (1994: 139) resolves the conflict as follows:

Some [types of behavioural clause] also regularly feature a prepositional phrase in it with to, at or on: I’m talking to you, don’t look at me, fortune is smiling on us. These are, in origin, circumstances of Place; in the behavioural context they express orientation but we may continue to use that label.

[3] To be clear, this is a behavioural clause, but the cricket is clearly not a Behaviour of the first participant. Halliday (1994: 139) resolves the conflict as follows:

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause. Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the mental analogue.

[4] To be clear, this is not a behavioural clause, if only because the Range, the new project, is not a behaviour of the Medium they. Although, the Process describe does not project, consistent with verbal clauses, it construes its Medium as a symbol source and its Range as the content of what is said (Verbiage), and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 347) identify such clauses as verbal:

The two kinds of Verbiage, that which refers to the content, as in describe the apartment, and that which specifies the nature of the verbal process, like tell a story, are analogous respectively to the material ‘entity Scope’ and ‘process Scope’.

Giving criterial priority to 'ability to project' thus leads to the misclassification of process types.

Misrepresenting Verbal Processes As Mental

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 125):

Verbal or mental?

Note too that a small set of ‘verbal judgement’ verbs – see Section 3.7 (i) above – such as condone, criticise, excuse, applaud may also occur with an embedded fact clause: The press applauded the fact that no violence occurred; The press condoned the fact that some violence occurred. In these contexts, no Receiver is possible and such verbs are functioning as mental processes of emotion.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the crucial distinction between mental and verbal clauses is that mental clauses construe the Medium participant as a conscious thing, whereas a verbal clause construes it as a symbol source, conscious or otherwise. If these clauses were to be interpreted as 'mental: emotion', they would misconstrue non-conscious things, such as newspaper headlines, as experiencing emotions, as exemplified by:

Cf. genuine 'mental: emotion' clauses, which, unlike the above, are bi-directional:

Jim likes the fact that he was paid vs the fact that he was paid pleased Jim

Clearly, the purported impossibility of a Receiver is insufficient reason to classify such clauses as mental, and the clauses are verbal in every other respect:

Misrepresenting A Verbal Quoting Complex As A Behavioural Clause

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124-5):

One final borderline case is when a sound is ‘quoted’, usually with go realising the process. For example:

the tyres went ‘screech!’

the little engine went ‘wheeee!’

the car went ‘bang!’

It is not possible to have a Receiver in these clauses since the sound is simply a sound and not a piece of language being addressed to anyone. They are therefore moving towards the material end of a cline and are best treated as behavioural.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these are clause complexes, not clauses; see [2].

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, each of these is a material happening realised metaphorically as a clause complex: a verbal clause projecting a quoted minor clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 510-1):

In fact, paratactic projection allows for a greater range: we can quote not only propositions and proposals but also minor speech functions such as greetings and exclamations…

In this case, the authors have misunderstood a material-verbal correspondence in a grammatical metaphor as the overlap of material and verbal features in a behavioural clause.

Again, proposing that behavioural processes can project unnecessarily complicates the theory without adding any explanatory power.

Misrepresenting Targeted Verbal Processes As Behavioural

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124):

We can also include on the behavioural borderline such ‘judgmental’ verbal processes as flatter, insult, praise, malign, slander, abuse which have the peculiarity of allowing for an additional participant role, the Target. These are analysed in IFG2: 141, IFG3: 256 as follows:

But as noted in IFG, they cannot project reported speech and are towards the material end of a cline. Because they cannot project, these too could be taken as behavioural and analysed in the following way:

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, once again the authors are proposing that a subset of verbal clauses should be reclassified as behavioural merely because they cannot report. There are several factors that invalidate this proposal, any of which would be sufficient on its own.

[1] The blanket statement that targeted verbal processes cannot report is invalidated by the following unremarkable example:

[2] Reclassifying targeted verbal clauses as behavioural clauses creates inconsistencies in terms of ergativity. Compare:

with the authors' proposed analysis:

To be clear, conflating Behaver with Agent in this instance complicates the description without adding any explanatory power not already provided by Halliday's original interpretation.

[3] Target and Receiver are participants of verbal clauses, and do not occur in genuine behavioural clauses: *They grumbled her to her parents.

[4] Unlike genuine behavioural processes, targeted verbal processes do not accept a Behaviour as a Range participant: *They insulted an insult.

Seriously Misrepresenting Behavioural Processes

 Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124):

Included in this behavioural group are processes which concern the creation of a symbolic representation. Verbs such as characterise, outline, describe, portray are used here, but again projection is not possible (e.g. they outline the plot is normal, but they outlined that the heroine was kidnapped is not possible) and these are behavioural rather than verbal.

Blogger Comments:

Here the authors appear to have completely lost the plot.

[1] The notion that behavioural processes are concerned with the creation of a symbolic representation is entirely inconsistent with the notion of behavioural processes in SFL Theory (Halliday 1985: 128-9; Halliday 1994: 139-40; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 248-52; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 301-2), and the authors provide no argument whatsoever in support for their novel proposal, let alone provide evidence of the greater explanatory power to be gained by creating this theoretical inconsistency.

[2] To be clear, there are three key criteria that rule out interpreting clauses featuring verbs such as characterise, outline, describe, portray as behavioural. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354) present the criteria for distinguishing process types as follows:

First, the number of inherent participants in a behavioural clause is one, whereas the number in such clauses is two, since each is incomplete without a second participant:

they characterised…

they outlined…
they described…
they portrayed…

Second, a behavioural clause necessarily construes the first participant as a conscious thing, whereas these clauses do not:

the report characterised…
the book outlined…
the article described…
the documentary portrayed…

Third, behavioural clauses are middle in voice, whereas these clauses are effective, and so operative or receptive:

…was characterised by…

…was outlined by…

…was described by…

…was portrayed by…

Importantly, these verbs serve as different (non-behavioural) process types, depending on the clause in which they figure; see, for example, 'Portray' As Relational Process.

[3] To be clear, as the above demonstrates, the inability of a process to project is insufficient reason to categorise it as behavioural.

Seriously Misrepresenting Behavioural And Verbal Processes

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124, 124n):

Note that there are a number of processes representing verbal behaviour – talk, chatter, gossip, speak, lie – that are behavioural rather than verbal¹⁸; they cannot project. (See Table 4.9 above for examples.) For example, we cannot say they gossiped that their neighbours had had a wild party. (Note that while behavioural process can, in a written narrative, project by quoting: ‘I enjoyed it thoroughly’, he lied, a true verbal process can project both direct and indirect speech in all contexts.)

¹⁸ IFG3: 251 Table 5(24) lists these as verbs functioning in behavioural clauses; however they also appear on p. 255 as examples of verbs functioning in verbal clauses of ‘activity’. The inability of such clauses to project is an argument for preferring the behavioural interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents behavioural processes. In such cases, the lexical choice adds a behavioural feature to a verbal Process. Halliday (1994: 139):

…while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’…

However, in the case of lied, what is added to the verbal Process is the quality 'untruthful':

[2] To be clear, this is a bare assertion unsupported by argument. Just as not all mental processes project, not all verbal processes easily project reported speech, Halliday (1994: 141) observes:

[3] This is misleading, since the only verb common to both lists is talk. The 'behavioural' list is chatter, grumble, talk, gossip, argue, murmur, mouth whereas the 'verbal activity' list is praise, insult, abuse, slander, flatter, blame, criticise, chide, speak, talk.

But, more importantly, the fundamental misunderstanding here is that verbs can be assigned to process types, without regard to the clauses in which they function.

[4] To be clear, even if a difficulty in reporting were equivalent to an inability to project, this is demonstrably still a very inadequate reason for interpreting targeting verbal clauses as behavioural clauses, because it creates unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies.  For example, a behavioural clause is middle voice, with the Behaver as Medium, whereas a targeted verbal clause is effective voice with Target as Medium, so that in a behavioural interpretation, the Behaver of such clauses must function as Agent, not Medium.

Moreover, a behavioural clause construes its first participant, Behaver, as conscious, whereas a targeted verbal clause, like other verbal clauses, only construes its first participant, Sayer, as a symbol source: the newspapers blamed the Trump supporters. And following on this, a behavioural clause construes its Medium participant, Behaver, as conscious, whereas, in a targeted verbal clause, the Medium participant, Target, need not even be animate: the report of the bureau of meteorology blamed La Niña.

To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354) provide eight criteria that distinguish verbal processes. Singling out just one of these, the ability to project, and giving it priority, results in unnecessary theoretical inconsistencies which add nothing to the explanatory power of the theory.

Misrepresenting Material 'Prescribe' As Behavioural

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 124):

Compare 

doctors are quick to prescribe antibiotics : doctors prescribe antibiotics quickly/willingly. 

In both cases the process being construed is the behavioural prescribe. But in the second case, an additional meaning feature has been added to create a ‘verbal group complex’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, prescribe does not function as a behavioural Process here, as demonstrated most clearly by the fact that the Range participant antibiotics is not a Behaviour. Given this, and the fact that the simple present tense here carries the added feature of 'habitual', the Process is clearly material.

[2] Trivially, the second case does not feature a verbal group complex.

Misrepresenting An Assigned Attributive Clause As An Identifying Clause (With An Ellipsed Token)

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 123):

Causative relational clauses (IFG2: 171; IFG3: 237-8, 299)

identifying

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the first clause, they christened the girl Victoria is a naming clause, and so the name is Token, not Value. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 288):

Naming and defining are linguistic exercises, in which the word is Token and its meaning is the Value. In ‘calling’, on the other hand, it is the name that is the Value.

[2] To be clear, the final clause, this proves my point, is attributive, not identifying, and it involves the conflation of Process and Attribute; see Table 5-14 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269).

Unlike unassigned attributive clauses, assigned attributive clauses, being effective in voice, are 'reversible', in that they can be either operative, as above, or receptive, as below:

Clearly, the clause with the imagined that (this proves that my point) — which presumably means 'this proves that to be my point' — is not equivalent in meaning or wording to the actual clause without it (this proves my point).

Misrepresenting Verbal Clauses

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 118):

But on the one hand, a mental projection is an idea, whereas a verbal one is a locution, and on the other hand, while all verbal clauses can project, only certain mental ones can (namely, cognitive ones and certain affective ones).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, 'certain affective' here means 'desiderative', and though all verbal clauses can quote, those that include a Target do not easily report (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 307).

Confusing Scope And Location

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 117):

Scope: it represents the scope of the performance of the Process, so it can often be preceded by a preposition that indicates the nature of this scope (on, at, in, etc.) – she climbed up the ladder. When it is a restatement of the Process, there is typically an alternative wording with Process alone – have a walk ~ walk; take a shower ~ shower. Since the Scope isn’t impacted, it can neither be construed with a result (Attribute, etc.) nor be probed with do to/with. Scopes are contrasted with Goals in Table 4.15:

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Where the element is a prepositional phrase, it functions as Location, not Scope. 

[2] To be clear, on the other hand, a Scope can be configured with a depictive Attribute:

Misrepresenting A Behavioural Process As Material [2]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 116-7):

In contrast, the Scope elaborates or enhances the Process.

(1) It elaborates the Process –

(a) by restatement (the traditional category of cognate object), as in:

he ran a tremendous race

(b) by specification (of the ‘lexical content’), as in:

they took a leisurely walk; she took a brisk shower

(c) or by exemplification (i.e., by giving a subtype of the process), as in:

they played a game of tennis; they danced a polka

(2) Alternatively, the Scope may enhance the Process, typically, by a circumstantial feature of space (location or extent):

they climbed the nearest peak; the horse jumped the fence; they roamed the streets

Blogger Comments:

Once again the authors misrepresent a behavioural process (Halliday 1994: 139) as material.

Elsewhere, like Halliday, Matthiessen (1995: 228, 251, 252, 348) lists dance with behavioural processes.

Misrepresenting Scope As Goal [2]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 116):

In addition to the participant roles discussed in the Survey section (Actor, Goal, Client/Recipient, Scope, Initiator), we may also find an Attribute in a material clause which has a Goal. The Attribute either specifies the state of a participant when participating in the process or as a result of the process. For example:

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, depictive Attributes also occur in material clause without a Goal:

[2] To be clear, in the first example, the bedroom construes the Scope of the Process left, not its Goal, since it enhances the Process in terms of location, rather than being impacted by the Process:

Misrepresenting A Behavioural Process As Material [1]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 111):

The transitive categories can be ‘translated’ into ergative ones as in Table 4.13, which shows that in addition to the Agent and Medium roles, the ergative model includes the Beneficiary and Range.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, after repeatedly misrepresenting material clauses as behavioural, here the authors misrepresent a behavioural clause, they did a dance, as material; see, for example, Halliday (1994: 139).

 

Elsewhere, like Halliday, Matthiessen (1995: 228, 251, 252, 348) lists dance with behavioural processes.

It can be added that Table 4.13 restricts the Behaver role to the Medium of a Process, despite the fact that the authors interpret a verbal clause with a Target as behavioural, in which case the "Behaver" is the Agent of the Process. 

Misrepresenting Scope As Goal [1]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 109-10):

From the transitive perspective, the question we are asking is whether the action carries over to affect an additional participant or not, and this provides the contrast between transitive and intransitive clauses. See Table 4.11:

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the second of the "transitive" clauses in Table 4.11 does not feature a Goal. If the militia were Goal, it would be affected by the Process fled. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 167):

The Goal is impacted in some way by its participation in the Process; the "impact" either (i) brings a participant into existence or else (ii) manipulates one that already exists.

Clearly the militia is neither brought into existence nor manipulated by the Process fled. Instead, the militia functions as Scope, because it construes the domain of the Process fled. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 239):

In contrast, the Scope of a ‘material’ clause is not in any way affected by the performance of the process. Rather it either (i) construes the domain over which the process takes place … or (ii) construes the process itself, either in general or specific terms…

cf.

Misrepresenting Material Processes As Behavioural [2]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 108):

Behaviourals also include more material-like subtypes. The border area (see Section 3.1) between material processes and behavioural ones is covered by two main types, physiological processes – twitch, shiver, tremble, sweat, etc. – and social processes – kiss, hug, embrace, dance, play, etc. Both of these shade into the verbal type, from different angles; physiologically: cough, gasp, stutter, etc. and socially: chat, talk, gossip etc.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the verbs kiss, hug, and embrace typically serve in clauses that are effective (operative vs receptive) in voice, in contradistinction to behavioural clauses, which are, almost always, middle in voice, and the first participant in such clauses is the Agent of the Process, rather than the Medium of the Process, as in behavioural clauses. Given the unmarked present tense, present-in-present, in SFL Theory, such clauses are material, not behavioural:

The behavioural interpretation can be found in the work of Matthiessen, where behavioural clauses are interpreted as a subtype of middle material clauses (1995: 43, 201, 235, 245, 252). Despite this, Matthiessen (1995: 252) interprets clauses like these as behavioural and effective (with a material Goal):

Interactive (reciprocal) behavioural material processes have the special property that co-participation can be construed either as one participant which is internally complex (e.g., Henry and Anne), in which case a reciprocal pronoun as Accompaniment may be added (e.g., Henry and Anne ... with each other), or as one participant configured with a circumstance of Accompaniment (e.g., Henry ... with Anne)…

Some verbs are less likely with the circumstantial option - for example Anne hugged with Henry is unlikely - and the potential co-participant is construed alternatively as a Goal instead - hug, embrace, kiss, marry, divorce…

Misrepresenting Material Processes As Behavioural [1]

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 107):

The following table illustrates the differences between related pairs of behavioural processes and mental processes of perception:

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, in these instances, the final two "behavioural" clauses are material, not least because the Range of the Process in each case, the flower, the wine, is not a behaviour.

The behavioural interpretation can be found in Matthiessen (1995: 228, 251), where behavioural clauses are interpreted as a subtype of middle material clauses (op. cit.: 43, 201, 235, 245, 252).

Misrepresenting Targeted Verbal Clauses As Behavioural

Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: 106, 108, 108n):

One sub-type of verbal clause (sometimes regarded as behavioural, see below Table 4.9) requires an extra participant, the Target, the entity construed as the target of the verbal action, as in she praised/insulted/blamed/criticised her father, where her father is in this role. …

¹⁰ IFG3: 255 treats the verbal subcategory of behaviourals as a special class of verbal process. (It is only members of this class that may involve a Target participant.) Unlike other verbal clauses, they cannot project another clause, and a projection has to be added by means of a verb like say, as in Then the monk praised Yang Shan saying: ‘I have come over to China in order to worship Manjucri, and met unexpectedly with Minor Shakya’ (although there are natural examples such as ‘Nelson played magnificent football’, Meek praised.). The closest to a representation of the content of praising, blaming, etc. in English is an enhancing clause of reason, as in She praised him for having acted so quickly; in Japanese, such clauses can in fact project (see Teruya, 2007). However, like verbal clauses, they can be construed with a Receiver, as in She praised him to her boss for having acted so quickly.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the question of whether targeted verbal processes (slander, insult, praise, flatter) are better reclassified as 'near verbal' behavioural processes (chatter, gossip, talk, speak) is a topological issue: a matter of degrees of relatedness. However, there are several criteria that can be used to clearly distinguish 'near verbal' behavioural processes from targeted verbal processes:

Firstly, the first participant of a 'near verbal' behavioural clause is construed as conscious (they chattered all day), whereas the first participant of a targeted verbal clause need only be a symbol source (the news story flattered him).

Secondly, the voice of a 'near verbal' behavioural clause is middle (they chattered all day), whereas the voice of a targeted verbal clause is effective, and so can be either operative (the news story flattered him) or receptive (he was flattered by the news story).

Thirdly, the unmarked present tense of a 'near verbal' behavioural clause is present-in-present (they are chattering in the garden), whereas the unmarked present tense of a targeted verbal clause is the simple present (that story flatters him).

Moreover, verbs that serve in targeted verbal clauses can also serve in assigning relational clauses, whereas verbs that serve in behavioural clauses cannot. That is, there is verbal assignment, but no behavioural assignment:

This demonstrates very clearly that reclassifying these verbal processes as behavioural is entirely unwarranted.

[2] This overstates the case. Although targeting verbal processes don't easily project (Halliday 1994: 141), even reporting cannot be entirely ruled out, as demonstrated by: